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Abstract—The superiority of deep learning performance is
threatened by safety issues for itself. Recent findings have shown
that deep learning systems are very weak to adversarial examples,
an attack form that was altered by the attacker’s intent to
deceive the deep learning system. There are many proposed
defensive methods to protect deep learning systems against
adversarial examples. However, there is still lack of principal
strategies to deceive those defensive methods. Any time a par-
ticular countermeasure is proposed, a new powerful adversarial
attack will be invented to deceive that countermeasure. In this
study, we focus on investigating the ability to create adversarial
patterns in search space against defensive methods that use image
filters. Experimental results conducted on the ImageNet dataset
with image classification tasks showed the correlation between
the search space of adversarial perturbation and filters. These
findings open a new direction for building stronger offensive
methods towards deep learning systems.
Keywords—Deep Neural Networks, Image Filters, Adversarial
Examples, Image Classification
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, there has been the rise of deep
learning in many tasks such as computer vision [1], automatic
driving [3], natural language processing [2], and so on . Deep
learning models are designed based on an assumption of inputs
and outputs distribution being benign. This leads to when
training deep learning models, we only focus to fine-tune the
weights, parameters or the number of nodes and hidden layers
while setting aside the validity of data. This has created a
security issue against deep learning systems. Szegedy et al. [4]
explored that deep neural networks are at risk of attacks from
adversarial example attacks. Afterward, many research work
on technologies that delude AI models has gradually become a
hot spot, and researchers have continued to propose new meth-
ods of attack and defense. Adversarial attacks have been regu-
larly adapted in both research and commerce. In the computer
vision area, many adversarial attacks are proposed in image
classification [5], [6], [7], [8], and object detection [9]. There
are also many researches work on the adversarial example in
text [10], [11], [12], [13]. In the physical world attack, Kurakin
et al. [14] first exposed that hazards of adversarial examples.
They use an application of Tensor-Flow Camera Demo to
capture original images. After that, they use Google Inception
V3 [15] for classifying those images. The implementation
has been shown that a large portion of the image has been
misclassified even when observed via the camera lens. Eykholt
Kevin et al. [16] invented a new method based on [7] and [17]
to create robust adversarial perturbation in the real world. They
indicated variation in view angles, distance, and resolution
are almost defeated by the robust adversarial examples in
physical settings. The proposed algorithm used a term as RP2
for Robust Physical Perturbations, which was used to craft
adversarial examples for road sign recognition systems that
perform a high deceiving rate in an efficient setting. And
many physical adversarial attacks are proposed in face recogni-
tion [21], machine vision [20], and road sign recognition [18].
In the cyberspace security field, there are adversarial attacks in
cloud service [22], malware detection [23], [24], and network
intrusion detection [25]. Besides the attack methods, many
defensive approaches have been proposed and they can be
branched into four main categories include adversarial training,
denoising, transformation and compression. Szegedy et al. [4]
used adversarial examples to train an AI model with the
ground truth labels, and it made that model more robust.
Goodfellow et al. [5] also used the adversarial training strategy
to improve the classification rate on adversarial examples
with the MNIST dataset. Tramr et al. [26] combined the
adversarial examples created from many different AI models
to increase the robustness of those models. [27], [28] proposed
new methods based on the image transformation to reduce
the misclassification rate of an AI model. [30], [31] assumed
almost adversarial examples are created in the high-frequency
domain and they proposed the new method based on image
filters to remove the adversarial perturbations. Das et al. [32]
introduced a defensive method based on JPEG compression
to deceive FGSM [5] and DeepFool [33] attacks. However,
newer adversarial attacks such as Carlini&Wagner attacks [7]
overcame these compression defensive strategies.
Our Contributions. In this work, we investigate the search
space of adversarial perturbation. A challenge in the process of
understanding the effects of adversarial noises is very limited
so far. How to determine the available space of adversarial
noises is very important. Understanding and identifying this
space will help us develop better protection systems for deep
learning against adversarial examples.
We describe our main contributions of this research as
below:
• We have recapped the numerous adversarial defensive
and attack methods. Moreover, we have provided a
perceptive review of these current methods.
• We discovered the close relationship between search
space of adversarial perturbation and image filters.
• Our research opens up a new perspective on creating
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stronger and more effective attacks on deep learning
systems.
Paper outlines. The remainder of our paper is described
as follows. Section II introduces the literature review and
the background of adversarial examples. Section III describes
our approach on search space of adversarial examples, and
Section IV demonstrate our implementation and evaluation
results. Section V summaries our work.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND
A. Literature review
In this work, we focus on the relation between feasible
space of adversarial perturbation and defensive methods based
on frequency domain. So we make a literature review on these
defensive methods in this section. Eliminating the adversarial
features and retaking the classification rate have been consid-
ered in many works. Xu et al. [34] proposed a new defensive
approach by using the feature squeezing strategies to remove
the adversarial features. There are two key ideas in [34].
The first one considered the bit depth in an input image. By
increasing or reducing the bit depth of image, the method
removed some adversarial features. The second one used the
median filter to defeat the adversarial features. However, [34]
required a range of thresholds to separate between adversarial
and legitimate features. So the selection of a relevant threshold
for a specific dataset or setting is a nontrivial task and it is
heuristic. Dang et al. [30] proposed a detection system for
automatically identifying adversarial examples with the image
filters (Gaussian, Median filter). The system doesn’t require to
setup any threshold for distinguishing adversarial and benign
images. However, there is unclear how the system is able to
suffer the stronger and new adversarial attacks. Our paper
shows that Gaussian blurring only works well on the small
adversarial perturbation, and it is futile to larger and stronger
adversarial perturbation.
B. Background
1) Convolutional Neural Networks: Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNNs) are designed to learn the important features
from the training dataset to match them with the given labels.
CNNs are used in many areas [1], [2] and provided open-
source [15]. CNNs include multilayers with many operations
to process signals from a lower layer to a higher layer in
hierarchy architecture. In this research, we emphasize in image
classification task so we only cover the brief fundamentals in
this area. In an image classification task, CNNs process an
input data x and try to figure out the best matching output
label y from a set of labels Y . The structure of a CNN can
be described as shown in table I. The layers are described
in a top-down order from input to output. We can see for this
CNN network, the input is a color image of size 299×299. The
first layer is a convolutional layer whose kernel size is 3×3
with a stride of 2. The next convolutional layers also use the
same kernel size with a difference with the number of kernels
as well as stride. In an inception network, it appears layers
called inception layers. These inception layers are different
from convolutional layers in that they combine several different
kernel sizes at once to extract more important features. The
inception layer can also be called inception filters. The last
adjacent layer is the logits layer before the softmax function
is implemented to calculate the probability for each output
label corresponding to the input.
TABLE I: Google Inception Architecture [15]
layer patch/stride or note input
conv 3 × 3/2 299 × 299 × 3
conv 3 × 3/1 149 × 149 × 32
conv padded 3 × 3/1 147 × 147 × 32
pool 3 × 3/2 147 × 147 × 64
conv 3 × 3/1 73 × 73 × 64
conv 3 × 3/2 71 × 71 × 80
conv 3 × 3/1 35 × 35 × 192
3 × Inception Inception filters 35 × 35 × 288
5 × Inception Inception filters 17 × 17 × 768
2 × Inception Inception filters 8 × 8 × 1280
pool 8 × 8 8 × 8 × 2048
linear logits 1 × 1 × 2048
softmax classifier 1 × 1 × 1000
2) Adversarial Attacks: Adversarial examples are defined
as malicious patterns created by the slightly modified aim to
fool an AI model but indistinguishable from humans.
FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method). was proposed
by Ian Goodfellow et al. [5]. In a normal training process,
the input and output data distributions are assumed as fixed
and unchangeable, so there are only trainable parameters and
weights that are fine-tuned respect to a loss objective function
between input x and label y. [5] used a very simple idea to
reverse that normal process when they fine-tuned input data
distribution respect to a new loss objective function between
new sample xadv with new specific label yadv:
xadv = x− β · sign(OxLoss(xadv, yadv)) (1)
where β denotes the perturbation size to create an adversarial
example xadv from a legitimate input x. From a legitimate
input x, FGSM looks for the best adversarial perturbation β
to add into x to create a new image xadv . The value of β
has to satisfy two requirements include the magnitude of β is
as small as possible and respect to the loss objective function
between (x,y). For the first requirement, the magnitude of β
is smaller, xadv is more similar as x but the convergence
rate of the algorithm 1 is slower, while the bigger β makes
xadv is more different from the x but the FGSM algorithm
converges faster. For the second requirement, the loss objective
function between (x,y) is maximized and Loss(xadv, yadv) is
minimized. Because the total of probabilities of output is equal
to one, so the algorithm 1 only needs to consider to minimize
Loss(xadv, yadv).
In this paper, we use the FGSM [5] method with l-norm
optimization as a baseline to conduct assessments of the
possible value areas of β during the creation of adversarial
examples. Our attack method is based on a white-box attack
where victim AI model information is known in advance and
can be accessed.
3) Defensive approaches: There are many methods of
protection that have been proposed. The typical strategy is
adversarial training [4], [19], [26]. The idea of this strategy of
protection is that the AI models will be trained with adversarial
examples and ground truth labels. With the assumption that
the more AI models are learned, the more accurate they will
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regain and the more likely it will be to misidentify adversarial
examples. However, the major drawback of the adversarial
training method is that it takes a lot of time to create adver-
sarial examples and training time for AI models. In addition,
this method does not guarantee resistance to new adversarial
examples created by other methods than those created by the
previous method. Other defensive methods that are often in-
vestigated to be pre-processing data. These defensive methods
include preprocessing methods based on image transforma-
tion [27], [28], filter [30], [31] or compression [32]. Those
methods of defense have very impressive results in helping AI
systems identify which input is adversarial or legitimate. One
of the defenses which also attracts high attention is gradient
masking. The adversarial attack methods are largely based on
gradient calculations to optimize the loss objective function
when creating adversarial examples. For that reason, the idea
of hiding the gradient value was proposed. [26] proposed a
gradient masking method based on smoothing the gradient
gradients that made the global optimal calculation based on
gradient slope is more difficult. [37] uses another strategy that
is distillation synthesized from different models to create a
stronger model against adversarial examples.
III. SEARCH SPACE OF ADVERSARIAL PERTURBATION
A. Search Space on Attacking Phase
One of the important factors in the process of creating
adversarial examples is the adversarial perturbation coeffi-
cient β. However, how to find out the optimal value of β
and its relationship to the currently most powerful defense
methods in relation to image filter [30] is unclear. That is
the purpose of this study. In this research, we investigate on
a white-box attack in creating adversarial examples. This is
the setting defined as the attacker can access and use the
AI model parameters for conducting an attack pattern. This
is possible because currently, the most powerful AI models
in image classification tasks are open-source. Many attack
methods have been proposed, but most of them rely on FGSM
for development, generally, we also use FGSM for creating
adversarial examples. One thing to note, it is possible to
classify adversarial attacks into two different types based on
the purpose of the attacker include non-targeted and targeted
attacks. The non-targeted attack is defined as the attacker
only focuses on maximize the loss function of (x, y) in order
to deceive the AI system. Meanwhile, a targeted attack is
defined as the attacker wants to trick the AI system into a
misclassifying new pattern in an intentional label rather than
merely misidentifying it. Because of this, targeted attacks are
more commonly used than non-targeted attacks and we also
use it in attacking phases. Our main purpose to decide the
size of adversarial perturbation, it means the search space of
adversarial perturbation. We consider the norm operation to
determine the size of the adversarial noises. Mathematically,
the norm operation is used to calculate the distance, or the
length of the vectors or the matrixes according to element-wise.
The bigger the norm value, the bigger the difference between
vectors or matrices and vice versa. Formally, the lp-norm of
vector x is defined as: ‖x‖p = p
√∑
i |xi|p, where p ∈ R.
This is a pth-root of a summation of all elements to the pth
power is what we call a norm. The important point is even
though every lp-norm is all looked very similar to each other,
their mathematical properties are very different and thus their
application is completely different when we use to create the
adversarial examples. In this work, we consider three common
norm methods: l1-norm, l2-norm, and l∞-norm for evaluating
the size of the search space of adversarial perturbation.
l1-norm. We define xtrue as the original input vector, l1-
norm of xtrue is defined as:
‖xtrue‖1 =
∑
i
∣∣∣x(i)true∣∣∣ (2)
This norm is also well-known as the Manhattan norm and it
is one of very common norm operations.
l2-norm. is the most popular norm and also known as the
Euclidean norm. The l2-norm and other norms are equivalent
in the sense that all of them are defined in the same topology.
The l2-norm is defined as:
‖xtrue‖2 =
√∑
i
(x
(i)
true)
2 (3)
We use the l2-norm to measure the difference between two
vectors xtrue and xadv , the l2-norm is re-defined:
‖xtrue − xadv‖2 =
√∑
i
(x
(i)
true − x(i)adv)2 (4)
where xadv defines the adversarial example.
l∞-norm. The l∞-norm is defined as equation below:
‖xtrue‖∞ = ∞
√∑
i
(x
(i)
true)
∞ (5)
Let consider the vector x, if x(i) is each element in vector x,
from the property of the infinity itself, we have: x∞i ≈ x∞k ∀i 6=
k, then
∑
i x
∞
i = x
∞
k . And we have ‖x‖∞ = ∞
√∑
i x
∞
i =
∞
√
x∞k = |xk|. Now we have simple definition of l∞-norm as:‖x‖∞ = max(|xi|).
So our attack phase is denoted as Algorithm 1 by using
FGSM. Where xtrue defines the original input, xadv is ad-
versarial example, ytrue defines the ground-truth label, yadv
is an adversarial label, f is the activation function of machine
learning model, β is the maximum adversarial value, li defines
the norm. For crafting adversarial example, we set a learning
rate lr is equal to 0.01, the number of iteration is 500 times.
B. Filter Methods
Most adversarial attack methods look for the optimal values
of adversarial perturbation respect to loss objective function
to modify the original image. Therefore, the pixels that are
incidentally edited are located in the high-frequency domain.
Therefore current protection methods based on image filters
have proved very effective in eliminating these adversarial
noises. However, in order to better understand the search space
of this adversarial perturbation and the ability to resist image
filters, we studied the two most common image filters, the
Gaussian and the Median filter. Mathematically, a Gaussian
filter modifies the input image by calculating a convolution
the area of a specific image area with a Gaussian function; this
transformation is also known as the Weierstrass transform. The
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Algorithm 1: Crafting Adversarial Examples with l-norm
optimization
input : xtrue, ytrue, yadv , f , β, li
output : xadv
parameter: lr = 0.01, iterations = 500
1 xadv ← xtrue // initial adversarial
example
2 δ ← ~0 // initial adversarial
perturbation
3 it← 1 // initial iteration loop
4 while δ < β and f(xadv) 6= yadv and it <= iterations
do
5 xadv ← xtrue − δ · sign(5Loss(yadv|xadv))
6 δ ← norm(li)
7 maximize Loss(yadv|xadv) respect to δ
8 δ ← clip(xadv, x− β, x+ β)
9 it← it+ 1
10 end
11 return xadv
area of convolution is often called kernel size and is usually
3x3 or 5x5. When using a Gaussian filter, the kernel window
will move across the surface of the input image and compute
the kernel window that corresponds to the image area being
processed. The second image filter to be considered in this
research is the median filter. This is a very common filter
used to highlight the edges of an image. The Median filter
also uses kernel windows that move across the input image
surface. However, the median filter processes that area simply
by finding the median value of the image area being processed,
then replacing that median value in the pixel position in the
center of the windows kernel while preserving the pixel values
in neighbors. Our filtering system proceeds by Algorithm 2,
where x defines the input image, ϕ denotes the kernel sizes,
f is a machine learning function that computes the predicted
label with the highest probability, ytrue defines the ground
truth label, yadv defines the adversarial label, and s is the filter
function. Output are the probabilities of the ground truth label
(ptrue) and the adversarial label (padv).
Algorithm 2: Image Filters on input for image classifi-
cation task
input : xtrue, s, f, ytrue, yadv
output : ptrue, padv
parameter: ϕ = [(3× 3); (5× 5)]
1 for i in ϕ do
2 xfiltered ← s(x, i)
3 P ← f(xfiltered)
4 ptrue ← P (ytrue)
5 padv ← P (yadv)
6 end
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
A. Datasets and AI model
The target AI model that we use in the implementation is
Google Inception V3 [15] that was trained with 1,000 common
categories in the ImageNet [38] dataset. Our attacking phase is
a white-box attack setting and a targeted label is “street sign”
label. We use FGSM with l1-norm, l2-norm, and l∞-norm to
craft adversarial images.
B. Results
Intuitively, because of the copyright issue of the ImageNet
dataset, we use our own images (include pictures of vending
machine, computer mouse and keyboard) for analysis. We
randomly selected targeted labels for the creation of adversarial
images. By using the FGSM method in combination with l1-
norm, l2-norm, and l∞-norm, from each original image we
create three different adversarial images.
Fig. 1 shows the probabilities of the original vending
machine label when the input is an vending machine image.
Fig. 2 shows the probabilities of the adversarial label with
Fig. 1: Classification Results on Vending Machine Image with
observation on the probabilities of Original Label
vending machine input. Fig. 3 shows the observations on the
Fig. 2: Classification Results on Vending Machine Image with
observation on the probabilities of Adversarial Label
images of computer mouse and keyboard.
Fig. 4 shows the results of creating adversarial images from
the original image of the vending machine. We find that the
deep learning system is easily fooled with adversarial images.
In addition, we intuitively observe that adversarial images
created with l1-norm and l2-norm are harder to detect than
l∞-norm.
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(a) Observation on the probabilities of Original Keyboard Label (b) Observation on the probabilities of Adversarial Label
(c) Observation on the probabilities of Original Computer Mouse Label (d) Observation on the probabilities of Adversarial Label
Fig. 3: Classification Results on Keyboard and Computer Mouse Images
Fig. 5 shows the experimental results when we use the
image filters method on the original image of the vending
machine. We find that the Gaussian filter reduces classification
accuracy more than the median filter. Especially in the case of
the median with size filter 3×3 and 5×5, the classification
results are better than the original image.
Similar to the original image, we also apply image filter
methods to adversarial images. Fig. 6 shows classification
results on adversarial images created by the FGSM method
in combination with l1-norm. Fig. 7 illustrates classification
results on adversarial images created by the FGSM method in
combination with l2-norm. We observed that Gaussian kernel
size 3x3 could not restore identity to ground truth label on
adversarial image with l2-norm. The probability for vending
machine label is only 14.8%. Meanwhile, the median filter
still works effectively in removing adversarial noises. Fig. 8
shows classification results on adversarial images created by
the FGSM method in combination with l∞-norm. We observed
that Gaussian kernel size 3×3 could not eliminate the effect
of adversarial noise with l∞-norm on deep learning system
classification. Gaussian 5×5 gives better results, but the label
with the highest probability of identification is “tabacco shop”.
The Median filter removes adversarial noises but cannot help
the deep learning system correctly identify ground truth labels.
Table II shows experimental results on vending machine (v-
machine), computer mouse (c-mouse) and keyboard sets. This
result shows us a large correlation between norm operations
in search space of adversarial examples. It is clear that for the
l∞-norm, the Gau (3×3, 5×5) and median (3×3) methods are
more difficult to completely eliminate adversarial noises based
on the l1 and l2 norm. Median (5×5) still proved superior in
removing adversarial noises in all settings.
V. CONCLUSION
In this study, we focus on investigating the connection
between the search space of adversarial examples and the
defense based on the frequency domain. Our empirical results
demonstrate that the FGSM method in combination with l∞-
norm produces the strongest adversarial examples. In this case,
both the Gaussian and the Median filters are unable to restore
identification to the ground truth label. However, when using
l∞-norm to create adversarial examples, we also significantly
reduce the quality of the original image compared to using l1
and l2 norm. In terms of similarities with the original image,
l1 and l2 norm produce much better adversarial examples than
l∞ norm.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We would like to thank Professor Akira Otsuka for the
valuable suggestions on this research. This work was supported
by the Iwasaki Tomomi Scholarship.
www.ijacsa.thesai.org 5 | P a g e
(IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications,
Vol. 1, No. 1, 2020
(a) Orginal Vending Machine (b) Adversarial FGSM L1 Vending Machine
(c) Adversarial FGSM L2 Vending Machine (d) Adversarial FGSM L∞ Vending Machine
Fig. 4: Adversarial Vending Machine (targeted class: Street Sign)
TABLE II: Implementation Results
Input No filter Gau 3x3 Med 3x3 Gau 5x5 Med 5x5OL AL OL AL OL AL OL AL OL AL
Org v-machine 0.779 0 0.558 0 0.881 0 0.517 0 0.857 0
adv l1 v-machine 0 0.999 0.589 0.004 0.805 0.001 0.604 0.001 0.827 0
adv l2 v-machine 0 1 0.148 0.015 0.543 0.006 0.407 0.001 0.804 0
adv l∞ v-machine 0 1 0.031 0.157 0.053 0.005 0.066 0.002 0.064 0.001
Org keyboard 0.894 0 0.767 0 0.761 0 0.661 0 0.4 0
adv l1 keyboard 0 0.999 0.529 0.002 0.665 0 0.556 0 0.451 0
adv l2 keyboard 0 0.999 0.596 0.002 0.567 0.001 0.57 0 0.383 0
adv l∞ keyboard 0 1 0 0.977 0.139 0.107 0.132 0.01 0.267 0
Org c-mouse 0.724 0 0.93 0 0.937 0 0.964 0 0.924 0
adv l1 c-mouse 0 0.999 0.518 0.004 0.911 0 0.914 0 0.884 0
adv l2 c-mouse 0 1 0.116 0.045 0.168 0.005 0.757 0 0.793 0
adv l∞ c-mouse 0 0.999 0 0.995 0 0.9 0.014 0.013 0.218 0
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